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Better P-Curves: Making P-Curve Analysis More Robust To Errors, Fraud,
and Ambitious P-Hacking, A Reply To Ulrich and Miller (2015)
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When studies examine true effects, they generate right-skewed p-curves, distributions of statistically
significant results with more low (.01 s) than high (.04 s) p values. What else can cause a right-skewed
p-curve? First, we consider the possibility that researchers report only the smallest significant p value (as
conjectured by Ulrich & Miller, 2015), concluding that it is a very uncommon problem. We then consider
more common problems, including (a) p-curvers selecting the wrong p values, (b) fake data, (c) honest
errors, and (d) ambitiously p-hacked (beyond p ⬍ .05) results. We evaluate the impact of these common
problems on the validity of p-curve analysis, and provide practical solutions that substantially increase
its robustness.
Keywords: p-curve, publication bias, p-hacking

gender or not, and whether the dependent variable is logtransformed or not. Which of these four significant results will the
authors report?
P-Curve analysis assumes that among p ⬍ .05 results, the
magnitude of the p value does not affect whether it gets reported.
The assumption is met if researchers report all significant results,
a random subset, or more likely, the subset that makes for a more
compelling or fluent write-up (e.g., the simplest statistical test, or
a test used elsewhere in the article).2
Ulrich and Miller (2015) correctly note than if instead researchers systematically only report the smallest p value obtained, then
p-curve would be right-skewed even in the absence of an effect.
Their reasoning is straightforward: Reported p values get smaller
when only the smallest are reported.
In this article we first respond to Ulrich and Miller’s critique,
and then we extend it. In our response, we explain why we believe
the problem they identify to be quite rare. In our extension, we
consider and provide practical solutions to more common problems that may invalidate p-curve analyses.

Because statistically significant results are more likely to be
published than nonsignificant ones, published scientific evidence
is biased. As a consequence, it is difficult to know whether a set of
significant findings is indicative of a true effect or whether it
reflects nothing more than the selective reporting of significant
results. We developed p-curve analysis to mitigate this problem
(Simonsohn, Nelson, & Simmons, 2014). P-Curve is the distribution of statistically significant p values (ps ⬍ .05). True effects,
those that differ from zero, lead to right-skewed p-curves (e.g.,
more .01s than .04s). Nonexistent effects lead to flat p-curves (as
many .01s as .04s). And many forms of p-hacking, the selective
reporting of analyses that are p ⬍ .05, lead to left-skewed p-curves
(more .04s than .01s).1 When the observed p-curve for a set of
studies is right-skewed, we conclude that it contains evidential
value; that is, we rule out selective reporting of statistically significant analyses and studies as the only explanation for the results.
Ulrich and Miller (2015) identify a problem with this approach,
a problem we had not paid enough attention to until reading their
article. The concern is simplest to explain with a stylized example.
Imagine a researcher who runs a two-cell experiment investigating
the anchoring effect (as in Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Every
participant estimates the length of the Mississippi river after considering either a small or large anchor value. The observed anchoring effect is p ⬍ .05, whether one controls for participant

Reporting Only the Smallest p Value Is a Rare
Form of P-Hacking
For at least two reasons, we believe that in the vast majority of
cases, researchers are unlikely to report only the smallest p value.
First, doing so will typically require reporting analyses that are
unusual, undermining the credibility of the results. For example,
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1
P-Hacking with statistically independent tests also leads to a flat
p-curves; see Supplement 3 in (Simonsohn et al., 2014).
2
If researchers are “biased” toward reporting the simplest p ⬍ .05, the
expected p-curve is still uniform under the null. This is true because all
analyses, simple and complex, have uniform p-curves under the null, hence
complexity is, ex-ante, uncorrelated with p values.
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the anchoring article that reports a straightforward comparison of
means will seem more credible than one that reports only a result
with a log transformation and a gender control. When alternative
analyses differ in how interesting, compelling, or valid they are, as
we believe they almost always do, reporting only the smallest p
value undermines the very goal motivating p-hacking in the first
place, the goal of reporting persuasive evidence. The researcher is
better served by reporting the most persuasive analysis that is
significant rather than the one that is the most significant.
Second, p-hacking occurs when honest researchers face ambiguity about which analyses to run, and convince themselves that
those leading to better results are the correct ones (see, e.g.,
Gelman & Loken, 2014; John, Loewenstein, & Prelec, 2012;
Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011; Vazire, 2015). Motivated
reasoning requires ambiguity (Kunda, 1990). The behavior simulated by Ulrich and Miller strikes us as too unambiguously exploitative to be the result of motivated reasoning.
For instance, they simulate collecting 32 different measures,
running 32 different tests, and reporting the single smallest p
value.3 We doubt that under most circumstances even the most
motivated of thinkers could persuade themselves that such behavior is acceptable. We fool ourselves into overeating ice cream by
repeatedly taking the “last” trip to the freezer, not by serving all
portions at once on the first trip.

Some Evidence
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analyses must be, by the nature of the data, performed simultaneously.
Ulrich and Miller provide only one example in which the type of
selective reporting they are concerned about has been documented:
early fMRI psychology research. Vul, Harris, Winkielman, and
Pashler (2009) found that about 40% of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) researchers reported results in their articles only for the voxel most correlated with a variable of interest
(within a region of interest). This example satisfies all three
conditions. Any voxel would be considered equally interesting
ex-post, the analysis of any voxel would be equally justifiable
ex-ante, and the nature of fMRI testing meant that all analyses
were conducted simultaneously. We believe gene studies that
examine exploratory correlations with behavior traits, and singlecell recording studies, may also occasionally satisfy all three
conditions.
It is valuable to be aware of these exceptions, but important to
keep in mind that they are exceptions. For the vast majority of
psychological research, theories, previous empirical findings, and
readers’ intuitions deem some results much more interesting, and
some analyses much more credible, than others. In addition, analyses are almost always conducted sequentially. Next we consider
more likely paths to invalid p-curves.

Problem 1: P-Curvers Not Following Directions

In our original article, we p-curved a set of experiments published in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (JPSP)
with results reported only with a covariate. We conjectured that
researchers would leave out the simpler analysis without a covariate only if it was p ⬎ .05 (see Figure 3A in Simonsohn et al.,
2014). The way we understand p-hacking to happen, therefore,
predicts a left-skewed p-curve for these studies. Ulrich and Miller,
in contrast, write “If several possible covariates are available,
[authors] may well try them all and then report the one that
produces the most significant result” (p. 1138). This form of
“p-hacking” predicts a right-skewed p-curve (the main point of
their critique). The observed p-curve was significantly left-skewed.
Franco, Malhotra, and Simonovits (2014) obtained information
on all studies conducted using an online platform funded by the
National Science Foundation (NSF), and examined which subset
of studies was written up, submitted, and published. Their data
provide a rare window into what researchers choose to report: only
the lowest p value or all the significant ones? We contacted the
authors and asked. They responded that “we are . . . finding strong
evidence of the ‘select all p ⬍ .05 results’” (Neil Malhotra,
personal email, May 6, 2015). At least for the types of research
published in JPSP, or conducted using the NSF-funded platform,
the evidence suggests that researchers do not p-hack by reporting
the smallest p value.

In Simonsohn et al. (2014) we explained how p values should be
selected from studies for p-curve analysis to be valid. For example,
we wrote,
Most studies report multiple p values, but not all p values should
be included in p-curve. Included p values must meet three criteria:
(a) test the hypothesis of interest, (b) have a uniform distribution
under the null, and (c) be statistically independent of other p values
(p. 540).

To help p-curvers apply these principles, Figure 5 in that article
shows which test(s) should be selected from the most common
experimental designs in psychology (e.g., two-cell, 2 ⫻ 2 factorial
design, etc.).4
P-Curvers, however, could disregard these directions, resulting
in invalid p-curves that distort readers’ understanding of the reviewed literatures and of p-curve analysis. P-Curvers selecting the
wrong tests is, by far, in our view and experience, the biggest
threat to the validity of p-curve analysis.
The most extreme violation consists of selecting all p values in
an article. One example is by Head, Holman, Lanfear, Kahn, and
Jennions (2015), who p-curved all p values published in Open
Access journals. The article asks an arguably meaningless question—“What is the evidential value of all tests, whether relevant or

Exceptions
For honest researchers to plausibly report the smallest of many
p values computed, we believe the following three conditions must
be met: (a) many alternative results for a given study must be
equally interesting ex-post, (b) the analyses underlying those many
alternative results must be equally justifiable ex-ante, and (c) those

3
They do also simulate less extreme versions (e.g., collecting only two
measures and reporting the lowest p value of those two). But these do not
really impact p-curve. For example, the share of p ⬍ .01 goes up from 20%
to about 21%. See their Figures 1–3 where k ⫽ 2.
4
Figure 5 is actually a table. Thanks to stringent rules, zealous copyediting, and our shortcomings as negotiators, it is officially a figure.
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irrelevant, whether supportive or unsupportive of the hypotheses of
interest?” and provides a statistically invalid answer.5
Less extreme but more frequent is the erroneous selection of p
values associated with the testing of interactions. For studies
examining attenuated interactions (“the effect is bigger here than
there”) the p value of the interaction goes into p-curve (and never
the p values of the simple effects), while for studies examining
reversing interactions (“the effect is positive here but negative
there”) the two simple effects go into p-curve (and never the p
value of the interaction).
The first published p-curve analysis we are aware of, which
reviewed the impact of ovulatory cycle on women’s preferences
(Gildersleeve, Haselton, & Fales, 2014), provides an example.
From a study predicting an attenuated interaction the p-curvers
selected the p value from the bigger simple effect. The correct p
value to select (the interaction) is 100 times larger (i.e., much less
significant) than the incorrectly selected one. Through email, one
of the authors, Haselton, indicated they independently had identified this unintentional error and that to the best of their knowledge
it is the only one in their review.6

Solution
Avoiding this biggest threat to the validity of p-curve analysis is
simple: Following the guidelines for selecting results from our
original article. Editors and reviewers evaluating p-curve articles
should begin by evaluating the P-Curve Disclosure Table (in
which authors summarize which test(s) they selected from each
study) and uncompromisingly demanding that authors follow the
guidelines that lead to valid p-curves. P-Curve articles without
P-Curve Disclosure Tables should not be sent out to reviewers.

Problems 2 and 3: Fake Data and Honest Errors
The human factors behind faking data and honest reporting errors
could not be more different, but because the solutions to mitigate their
impact on p-curve are the same, we discuss both in this section.

Fake Data
Articles with fabricated studies need not become influential to
heavily bias our understanding of the literature. A article with fake
data, never read by anybody, could nevertheless be influential by
distorting a meta-analysis that includes it. This is a plausible
scenario. In fact, it happened to us in the first systematic p-curve
analysis we ever conducted (in June of 2011). We had identified a
set of just over 20 articles that met a prespecified study selection
rule, including one article by Sanna et al. (2011).
Unlike the rest of the studies in the set, Sanna’s p values were
very low: p ⫽ .000004, p ⫽ .000009, and p ⫽ .0012. Surprised by
such strong results with very small samples (ns ranging from
15–20 per cell), we took a closer look and identified additional
anomalies, most notably that the SDs were shockingly similar
across conditions. This concern eventually led to a rigorous investigation of misconduct, the retraction of the article, and Sanna’s
resignation (for more information, see Simonsohn, 2013).
On its own, Sanna et al.’s article probably would not have been
too influential, but it would nevertheless heavily bias the metaanalysis of any set of articles that included it. To provide a

calibration we ran a simple simulation (R Code available from
https://osf.io/mbw5g/) in which we created sets of 25 statistically
significant results examining an effect that does not exist (i.e., 25
false-positives that in expectation have a flat p-curve). Adding one
of Sanna et al.’s studies to the mix (the one with the median p
value) raises the probability that the overall p-curve will be significantly (and falsely) right-skewed from the nominal 5% to 38%.
Including all three studies increases the probability of a false
right-skew to a heart-stopping 98%. One fake article by Sanna
assures virtually any literature of “evidential value.”
It would be extraordinarily coincidental for us to have come
across the only fraudulent article in psychology in our very first
p-curve analysis. Indeed, since 2011 we have come across at least
five articles (by different authors) with results that seem to us at
least as indicative of fraud as Sanna’s originally did. Separate from
these suspicions, since June of 2011 at least three more cases of
fraudulent data have come to light in psychology (Smeesters’s,
Stapel’s, and Förster’s cases). This sounds bad, but given how
serendipitous the discovery of fraud is, how difficult and costly it
is to pursue those suspicions, and how high a threshold exists to
conclude data are fabricated, probably most studies with fabricated
data go undetected. It is worse than it seems.

Honest Errors
Reporting errors are common. Reviews comparing reported test
statistics (e.g., “t(83) ⫽ 2.47”) with reported p values (e.g., “p ⫽
.016”) find that a substantial share of published results, about 15%,
have errors (Bakker & Wicherts, 2011; Berle & Starcevic, 2007;
McGuigan, 1995). On the one hand, the vast majority of these would
be inconsequential for p-curve analyses, both because they are small
(e.g., reporting p ⫽ .013 as p ⬍ .01), and because errors in reporting
p values from test statistics are corrected when using the app (www
.p-curve.com/app3). However, on the other hand, more consequential
errors are not detectable by comparing p values with test statistics, nor
are they corrected by the app (e.g., original authors miscoding a
variable or accidentally reporting the wrong test result). If the detectable levels of sloppiness are taken as evidence for undetectable levels
of sloppiness, there is cause for concern.
Solution. Although it is impossible to fully solve these problems, there are things that can be done. First, our field can work
toward reducing fraud and honest errors in the first place. The
simplest way to achieve this is through transparency: authors
should post their raw data, code, and materials, unless they have a
compelling reason not to (Simonsohn, 2013). Journals that do not
increase transparency requirements for publications are causally, if
not morally, responsible for the continued contamination of the
scientific record with fraud and sloppiness.
5
The authors randomly chose one p value from each article, the p values
were hence statistically independent but they were not uniform under the
null nor did they test the hypothesis of interest.
6
The original prediction by Little, Jones, Burt, and Perrett (2007) was
that “women would have stronger preference for symmetry at peak fertility
when rating for short-term than for long-term relationships” (p. 212;
emphasis added). Gildersleeve et al. (2014), therefore, should have selected
the interaction effect contrasting the impact of fertility on preference for
symmetry in short- versus long-term relationships. That test result is F(1,
201) ⫽ 6.54, p ⫽ .0113. Instead they selected the simple effect for
short-term relationships. That test result was t(208) ⫽ 3.91, p ⫽ .000125.
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Figure 1. This figure shows the difficulty of p-hacking beyond p ⬍ .05. The results are based on 15,000
simulations that build on those we reported in “False-Positive Psychology” (Simmons et al., 2011), in which
authors examine a nonexistent effect and p-hack by combining four different analytic decisions (adding 10
observations to 20 already collected, choosing from two dependent variables, dropping one of three conditions,
and including a moderating variable). Studies that do not obtain the desired p value are assumed to be
file-drawered. (R Code available from https://osf.io/mbw5g/). The 96 alternative analyses are assumed to be
carried out in random order. See the online article for the color version of this figure.

Second, we can build a more robust p-curve. In April of 2015
we released the third version of p-curve’s online app, www.p-curve
.com/app3, making it more robust to extreme results in two important ways. First, we now use Stouffer’s method instead of
Fisher’s method for aggregating results across studies (i.e., combining pp-values), because Stouffer’s method is less sensitive to a
few extreme results (see, e.g., Abelson, 2012, pp. 66 – 68).7,8
Earlier we saw that combining one of Sanna’s fake studies with 25
false-positive ones lead to a significantly right-skewed p-curve
37% of the time. That was using Fisher’s method, the approach
from our original article. Using Stouffer’s method cuts this probability in half (17%).
The online app now also automatically reports what happens
when dropping the most extreme p values, allowing p-curvers and
readers to know whether the overall conclusions depend on a few
results. See online supplement for details (https://osf.io/mbw5g/).
Third, p-curvers should examine the quality of the work they are
reviewing, rather than merely copy/pasting results uncritically. When
an original article reports problematic results— effects that are too big,
statistical results that do not match with the summary statistics, or
degrees of freedom that seem erroneously computed, and so forth—
p-curvers should report p-curve with and without those results.

Problem 4: Ambitious P-Hacking
What if researchers p-hack past p ⬍ .05? In this section we
explore the costs and consequences of such ambitious p-hacking
and introduce a modification to p-curve analysis that makes it
robust to plausibly intense levels of it.

The Difficulty of Ambitious P-Hacking
In “False-Positive Psychology” (Simmons et al., 2011), we
simulated studies conducted by researchers willing to pursue four

forms of p-hacking (e.g., dropping a condition, dropping a dependent variable, etc.). We found that the probability of obtaining a
p ⬍ .05 result for a nonexistent effect increased from 5% to 61%
(see Table 1 in that article).
Relying on the same simulations, Figure 1 shows that the required
intensity of p-hacking increases exponentially as p-hacking gets more
ambitious. For instance, once a nonexistent effect has been p-hacked
to p ⬍ .05, a researcher would need to attempt nine times as many
analyses to achieve p ⬍ .01. Moreover, as Panel B shows, because
there is a limited number of alternative analyses one can do (96 in our
simulations), ambitious p-hacking often fails.9
These results suggest that highly ambitious p-hacking (e.g., until
reaching p ⬍ .01) is too difficult to be plausible, especially
because there is not a strong incentive to do it. Honest researchers
with limited resources and limited motivated reasoning, and without strong incentives to p-hack much beyond p ⬍ .05, usually
cannot afford to be that ambitious.
Moderately ambitious p-hacking, however, does seem plausible.
A p ⬍ .045 is almost as cheap as a p ⬍ .05. It is not hard to
imagine that honest researchers may continue p-hacking past .05 to
7
PP-Values reflect the probability of obtaining at least as extreme a
significant p value under the null (the p value of the p value, hence
pp-value).
8
For k independent pp-values, Fisher’s test statistic is
冱⫺2ⴱlog(pp)⬃2(2k), and Stouffers’ is 冱⌽⫺1(pp)/sqrt(k)⬃N(0,1), where
⌽⫺1 is the inverse of the c.d.f. for the normal distribution (qnorm() in R
syntax).
9
We also performed a simulation in which the only form of p-hacking
consisted of “ data peeking,” running a t test after adding an observation to
each of two conditions, starting with n ⫽ 10 per cell, and ending when the
desired p value cutoff is obtained or when n ⫽ 100. Among studies
resulting in p ⬍ .05, getting to p ⬍ .05 requires 18 peeks, whereas getting
to p ⬍ .01 requires 90 peeks. Overall, a p ⬍ .05 is obtained 28% of the
time, a p ⬍ .01 only 9%.
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avoid, say, an eyebrow-raising p ⫽ .048. Only past p ⬍ .03 does
p-hacking get very expensive very quickly.
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Consequences of Moderately Ambitious P-Hacking
For an initial calibration, we selected sets of 20 p values obtained
from the simulations of ambitious p-hacking used to generate Figure
1 and submitted them to p-curve analysis. In the absence of p-hacking,
a nonexistent effect has, by definition, a 5% chance of a significant
right skew. As researchers p-hack trying to get p ⬍ .05, that probability drops, to just 2 in 10,000 in our simulations, because with
p-hacking, p-curve is left-skewed in expectation, so obtaining a significant right-skew becomes less likely.
Ambitious p-hacking results in either dropping the higher p
values, or replacing them with lower ones, increasing the odds of
a significant right-skew. When p-hacking to p ⬍ .045, this effect
is minimal, increasing the probability of a significant right-skew to

about .5% (half a percent). P-Hacking to p ⬍ .04 increases the
chances of an erroneous right-skew to a still acceptable 6%.
However, it is bad news beyond this point. P-Hacking to p ⬍ .035
raises the right-skew probability to 30%, and p-hacking to p ⬍ .03
raises it to 79%. P-Curve confuses plausible levels of ambitious
p-hacking for evidential value unacceptably often.

Solution to Ambitious P-Hacking
To deal with moderately ambitious p-hacking we focus on the
“half p-curve,” the distribution of p ⬍ .025 results, asking whether
the distribution of p values between 0 and .025 is right-skewed. On
the one hand, because half p-curve does not include barely significant results, it has a lower probability of mistaking ambitious
p-hacking for evidential value. On the other hand, dropping observations makes the half p-curve less powerful, so it has a higher
chance of failing to recognize actual evidential value.

Figure 2. Each plot depicts the share of simulations for which one concludes the underlying studies have
evidential value using either the full p-curve test (as in Simonsohn et al., 2014) or the novel half/full combination
test. Ambitiously p-hacked results analyzed via p-curve were obtained from the simulations behind Figure 1. (R
Code available from https://osf.io/mbw5g/). See the online article for the color version of this figure.
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Table 1
Summary of Common Problems That Invalidate P-Curve and Their Solutions
Problem

Solutions

(1) P-Curvers select incorrect tests into p-curve (e.g., selecting P-Curvers: Use Figure 5 in Simonsohn, Nelson, and Simmons (2014) to determine
from a study predicting an attenuated interaction the p-value
which tests to select from each study included in p-curve.
of the bigger simple effect, instead of that of the interaction). Reviewers: Compare the selection of p-values summarized in the submitted “P-Curve
Disclosure Table” to Figure 5
Editors: Before sending articles that include p-curve analyses to reviewers, ensure
the manuscript includes a “P-Curve Disclosure Table.”
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(2) Original data are fake.

Journals: Require the posting of raw data, original materials, and code to analyze
the data.
P-Curve app (1): Aggregate studies using Stouffer’s instead of Fisher’s method to
be less sensitive to few extreme values.

(3) Original results have honest reporting errors.

p-Curve app (2): Report how results change if most extreme observations are
dropped.
P-Curvers: Evaluate quality of original work, if errors or improbable results are
apparent, report p-curve results with and without including those studies.

(4) Ambitious p-hacking (e.g., p-hacking till p ⬍ .035).

New definition of evidential value:
“A set of studies is said to contain evidential value if either the half p-curve has a
p ⬍ .05 right-skew test, or both the full and half p-curves have p ⬍ .1 right-skew
tests.”

Fortunately, by combining the full and half p-curves into a
single analysis, it is possible to eliminate these false-positive
conclusions of evidential value without much of a decrease in
power. We introduce the following novel test of evidential value:
A set of studies is said to contain evidential value if either the half
p-curve has a p ⬍ .05 right-skew test, or both the full and half
p-curves have p ⬍ .1 right-skew tests.10
In Figure 2 we compare the performance of this new combination test with that of the full p-curve alone (the “old” test). The top
three panels show that both tests are similarly powered to detect
true effects. Only when original research is underpowered at 33%
is the difference noticeable, and even then it seems acceptable.
With just 5 p values p-curve has more power than the underlying
studies do. The bottom panels show that moderately ambitious
p-hacking fully invalidates the “old” test (in line with the calibration from above), but the new test is unaffected by it.11

Summary
The validity of p-curve is threatened by actions original researchers and p-curvers can take. The practical solutions put forward in this article, and summarized in Table 1, make p-curve
vastly more robust to such actions.

10
As with all cutoffs, it only makes sense to use these as points of
reference. A half p-curve with p ⫽ .051 is nearly as good as with p ⫽ .049,
and both tests with p ⬍ .001 is much stronger than both tests with p ⫽ .099.
11
When the true effect is zero and researchers do not p-hack (an unlikely
combination), the probability that the new test leads to concluding the
studies contain evidential value is 6.2% instead of the nominal 5% (R
Code: https://osf.io/mbw5g/).
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